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Culture and Power in Cultural Studies 
John Storey (University of Sunderland) 
   
Let me begin by first thanking the organisers (Rachel and Alan) for inviting me 
to speak at this workshop. I am honoured and delighted to be here. The title of 
my paper is ÔCulture and Power in Cultural StudiesÕ and my intention is to strip 
down cultural studies to its basic assumptions about culture and power in the 
hope that this may offer something productive to the study of Modern 
Languages (the success of which I have worried about since Alan first invited 
me). This hope will be most explicit when, towards the end of the paper, I 
connect Raymond WilliamsÕs work on keywords to the Cultural Studies 
(hereafter, CS) model of culture and power. 
Cultural Studies works with a very particular concept of culture; that is, it 
defines cultures as networks of meanings that are performed and made 
concrete in particular social practices; what Raymond Williams (1981) calls 
culture as Ôa realized signifying systemÕ. Culture defined this way (i.e. culture 
as meanings that are embodied, embedded and realized in social practice) 
consists of the shared social meanings that give our social worlds stability and 
coherence. This is not to reduce everything to culture as a realized signifying 
system, but it is to insist that culture defined in this way should be seen, as 
Williams (1981) argues, Ôas essentially involved in all forms of social activityÕ. 
While there is more to life than realized signifying systems, it is nevertheless 
the case that Ôit would [É] be wrong to suppose that we can ever usefully 
discuss a social system without including, as a central part of its practice, its 
signifying systems, on which, as a system, it fundamentally dependsÕ. In other 
words, culture defined in this way is fundamental to all social life; it is not, 
therefore, restricted to the arts or to different forms of intellectual 
production, it is an aspect of all human activities 
According to this definition, cultures do not so much consist of objects and 
actions. Rather, cultures are the shifting networks of signification in which 
objects and actions are made meaningful and understood as meaningful. For 
example, if I pass a name card to someone in China or Japan the polite way to 
pass and receive it is with two hands. If I pass or receive it with one hand I may 
cause offence. This is clearly a matter of culture. However, the ÔcultureÕ is not 
just in the social gesture, it is in the ÔmeaningÕ of the gesture. In other words, 
there is nothing essentially polite about using two hands; using two hands has 
been made to signify politeness. Nevertheless, signification has become 
embodied, embedded and realized in a material practice which, in turn, can 
produce material effects (i.e. cause offence and the consequences that might 
follow from causing offence). As Williams (1977) explains, ÔSignification, the 
social creation of meaningsÕ is Ôa practical material activityÕ. 
To share a culture, according to this preliminary definition, is to interpret the 
world, make it meaningful and experience it as meaningful, in recognisably 
similar ways. So-called Ôculture shockÕ happens when we encounter radically 
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different networks of meaning: when our ÔnaturalÕ or our Ôcommon senseÕ is 
confronted by someone elseÕs ÔnaturalÕ or Ôcommon senseÕ. But cultures are 
never simply shifting networks of shared meanings. On the contrary, cultures 
are always both shared and contested networks of meanings. Culture is where 
we share and contest meanings of ourselves, of each other, and of the social 
worlds in which we live. This idea is first made explicit in WilliamsÕs 
explanation of GramsciÕs concept of hegemony: 
[Hegemony] is a lived system of meanings and values. [É] It thus 
constitutes a sense of reality for most people . [É] It is [É] in the 
strongest sense a ÔcultureÕ, but a culture which has also to be seen as 
the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes. (1977) 
This is as much an explanation of WilliamsÕs ÔmatureÕ concept of culture as it is 
an explanation of hegemony.1 
There are two lessons we can draw from this way of thinking about culture. 
First, although the world exists in all its enabling and constraining materiality 
outside culture, it is only in culture that the world can be made to mean/made 
to signify. In other words, culture constructs our sense of ÔrealityÕ (Ôa lived 
system of meanings and valuesÕ); signification has a performative effect in that 
it helps bring into being what it seems only to describe. As Gramsci (2007) 
points out: 
It is obvious that East and West are arbitrary and conventional 
(historical) constructions, since every spot on the earth is simultaneously 
East and West. Japan is probably the Far East not only for the European 
but also for the American from California and even for the Japanese 
himself, who, through English political culture might call Egypt the Near 
East. [É] Yet these references are real, they correspond to real facts, 
they allow one to travel by land and by sea and to arrive at the 
predetermined destination. 
East and West [É] never cease to be Ôobjectively realÕ even though when 
analysed they turn out to be nothing more than a ÔhistoricalÕ or 
Ôconventional constructÕ. 
In other words, East and West are historical constructions directly connected to 
the imperial power of the West. However, they are forms of signification that 
have been realized and embedded in social practice. Cultural constructs they 
may be, but they do designate real geographic locations and guide real human 
movement.  
As GramsciÕs example makes clear, meanings inform and organize social action. 
Therefore, to argue that culture is best understood as a realized signifying 
system is not a denial that the material world exists in all its constraining and 
enabling materiality outside signification. Williams (1979) makes this very 
clear: Ôthe natural world exists whether anyone signifies it or not.Õ But what is 
also absolutely the case is that the natural (or the material) world exists for us 
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layered in signification and that how it is made to signify helps organise our 
relations with it.  
The second lesson we can draw from this way of thinking about culture 
concerns the inevitability of struggle over meaning. That is, because different 
meanings can be ascribed to the same object or event meaning making (i.e. 
the making of culture) is, therefore, always a potential site of struggle. The 
making of meaning is always entangled in what Valentin Volosinov (1973) 
identifies as the Ômulti-accentualityÕ of the sign. Rather than being inscribed 
with a single meaning, a sign can be articulated with different ÔaccentsÕ; it can 
be made to mean different things in different contexts with different effects of 
power. Therefore, the sign is always a potential site of Ôdifferently oriented 
social interestsÕ and is often in practice Ôan arena of . . . struggleÕ. Part of the 
ÔnormalÕ processes of hegemony is Ôto make the sign uni-accentualÕ, to make 
what is potentially multi-accentual appear as if it could only ever be uni-
accentual. In other words, things do not issue their own meanings; they provide 
the material for the articulation of meaning, variable meaning(s), as things are 
re-articulated in different contexts. 
Academics and students (like ourselves) continually acknowledge the multi-
accentuality of the sign. We do this when we describe an interpretation as a 
feminist reading, a queer reading, a post-colonial reading, a Marxist reading, 
etc. Doing this we implicitly acknowledge that the text in question has been 
made to mean from the critical perspective of a particular reading practice. 
Gender identities are also an example of the multi-accentuality of the sign. 
Masculinity and femininity have real material conditions of existence 
(ÔbiologyÕ), but there are different ways of representing masculinity and 
femininity, different ways of making them signify. Therefore, although 
masculinity and femininity exist in biological conditions of existence, what they 
mean, and the struggle over what they mean, always takes place in culture.  
This is not simply an issue of semantic difference, a simple question of 
interpreting the world differently. The different ways of making masculinity 
and femininity mean are not an innocent game of semantics, they are a 
significant part of a power struggle over what might be regarded as ÔnormalÕ; 
an example of the politics of signification; an attempt to make what is always 
multi-accentual appear as if it were only ever uni-accentual. In other words, 
the struggle over signification is about who can claim the power and authority 
to define social reality, to make the world (and the things in it) mean in 
particular ways. Therefore, rather than engage in a fruitless quest for the true 
or essential meaning of something, a critical CS always fixes its gaze on how 
particular meanings acquire their authority and legitimacy and it is this that 
makes culture and power its primary object of study. 
So how does this model of culture and power relate to the study of modern 
languages? Raymond WilliamsÕ Keywords (1976), is the most obvious example of 
thinking seriously about language in relation to a critical cultural studies model 
of culture and power.  
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In Keywords Williams is concerned with the ways in which words change their 
meaning in relation to changed and/or changing political, economic and social 
contexts and processes. However, as he makes clear, 
This does not mean that the language simply reflects the processes of 
society and history. On the contrary, [É] some important social and 
historical processes occur within language. [É] New kinds of 
relationship, but also new ways of seeing existing relationships, appear 
in language in a variety of ways: in the invention of new terms 
(capitalism); in the adaptation and alteration (indeed at times 
reversal) of older terms (society or individual); in extension (interest) 
or transfer (exploitation). But also, as these examples should remind 
us, such changes are not always either simple or final. Earlier and 
later senses coexist, or become actual alternatives in which problems 
of contemporary belief and affiliation are contested. 
My own research (Storey 2005) on the word ÔpopularÕ for New Keywords showed 
how the various struggles over the wordÕs meaning eventually produced 
different concepts of popular culture. So, for example, the rediscovery of the 
ÔfolkÕ (late 18th to the early 20th centuries) generated two opposite concepts of 
popular culture: the ÔstructureÕ of so-called mass culture (always urban) and 
the ÔagencyÕ of so-called folk culture (always rural).2 
Studying a modern language could reveal similar processes at work. One means 
of understanding the society whose language one is learning is to see how 
certain keywords make available a history (or histories) of meanings and values 
that have been articulated in different ways in different contexts with 
different effects of power. And by doing this kind of critical analysis it would 
allow one to understand what these struggles over meaning(s) reveal about the 
society in question. In this way, then, the learning of a modern language would 
also involve an investigation of the critical relations of culture and power. 
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 For a discussion of WilliamsÕ development of this ÔmatureÕ definition, see Storey 2010. 
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 See also Storey 2003 
